The Kindergarten, the Construction site, and the Assembly Line

Last night, I went to a local meetup where we played Legos. It was an event organised by Krzysztof Niewinski. In particular, it was a simulation workshop of large scale product development using alternative organizational structures. But there were lots of colored bricks involved. And the specs were pictures of the end products that needed to be built.

Without getting into too much detail, we covered 3 alternatives with the same group of 20 something people: component teams, cross functional teams of specialists, and finally "T-shaped" interdisciplinary teams where everyone could do everything. In short, we were experimenting with output using alternative ways of working. Each round took roughly 10 minutes.

Here's what happened

In the first round, we had specialized component teams each dedicated to working with only two different lego colors, a supply team, an integration team, a quality team, and 8 different product managers who wandered from table to table. Sound familiar? Kind of like a massive construction site with lots of project managers. Or in a large company developing and installing software. Most of the building teams sat around doing very little in practice. There were lots of bottlenecks and confusion around getting supplies and exact requirements. I had a chance to engage in chitchat with my table mates. And a stressed out senior executive that walked around and yelled at anyone for not doing anything.

The second round, we continued to have individual performers who were specialists, but they worked together, which resulted in a lean assembly line. The time required to first output went down almost 50%. But there was less top down control. And more legos on the table, relative to the previous round.

And finally--the last round--everyone pitched in and contributed how they could. There were still some constraints, in that people working outside of their expertise could only use their left hand. Despite that, it only took a minute to get the first outcome, so almost 9 times faster. But there were lots of extraneous legos on the table. It was lots of fun, and it was a very tactile learning experience for everyone who pitched in. Just like kindergarten.

What does this mean

This boils down to control, profitability, and speed. This is just as true for startups as it is for large companies. Most of the conflicts among co-founding teams boil down to differences how founders value control and money, according to Harvard professor and researcher Noam Wasserman in Founders' Dilemmas. In big companies, any larger product development program will implictly or explicitly make a call on these three, based on how the work is organized. It depends on what you optimize for, as Krzysztof the facilitator pointed out.

The construction site was optimized for control, especially of costs. There were enough people to do the work, and enough legos could be procured if you were willing to wait. But the level of resource scarcity locked up the system, relatively speaking. And it took a long time to finish anything.

The assembly line required a slightly larger up front investment but the speed at which things happened increased dramatically. Even though the constraints on each individual were exactly the same. As an expert in yellow and green bricks, I was still only allowed to touch these, even though the configuration was completely different.

The kindergarten required even less top down control and more resources, as well as trust that the teams will get on with it. There was be a higher use of resources (lego blocks laying on the table). At any given moment, you won't know exactly what is going on, because everyone is contributing and collaborating. The teams were releasing stuff like crazy. So at that point, does it really matter that you need a bit more money up front? If they are releasing stuff so quickly, presumably this translates into revenue, which keeps the kindergarten afloat and then some.

Choosing the metaphor works that best for your company

The way you organize the work matters. And it feeds into culture. Larman said "Culture follows structure". In a software context, it means you want to allow for chaos and experimentation. And not really just squeezing features out of development teams.

As a company scales from a successful startup to a larger company, the trick is to keep enough of that "kindergarten juice" in the culture and in how the work is organized, in order to allow your company to continue innovating. If the emphasis on control changes as a product matures, you can introduce more of that as needed. But do so consciously, and watch your output and outcomes like a hawk.

By micromanaging the process, even as an assembly line in a feature factory, you're still missing out on pretty big upside (assuming you care about having lots of new products released).

That said, even a kindergarten needs boundaries. So that the teams don't cut corners in quality for example. That's kind of the point. There are a handful of non-negotiables around safety, health, and security in a kindergarten, and everything else is optimized for discovery.

So for a bunch of interested strangers on a random school night, who dug into a few alternative structures and held everything else constant, it was clear that there could be very large differences at play. 14x faster, not 14% faster. These would be results any agile or digital transformation program would love to achieve. That said, it wasn't clear if these differences came from structure only, or the culture around it. And if culture is involved, that could be what's preventing the massive change in the first place.

Key Takeaways

• The way you organize work matters, and it feeds into the culture, particularly in a larger company.
• By organizing work, you will be making choices about tradeoffs among variables that matter.
• Control, in particular, seems to be inversely related with learning and speed.

The Kindergarten, the Construction site, and the Assembly Line

Last night, I went to a local meetup where we played Legos. It was an event organised by Krzysztof Niewinski. In particular, it was a simulation workshop of large scale product development using alternative organizational structures. But there were lots of colored bricks involved. And the specs were pictures of the end products that needed to be built.

Without getting into too much detail, we covered 3 alternatives with the same group of 20 something people: component teams, cross functional teams of specialists, and finally "T-shaped" interdisciplinary teams where everyone could do everything. In short, we were experimenting with output using alternative ways of working. Each round took roughly 10 minutes.

Here's what happened

In the first round, we had specialized component teams each dedicated to working with only two different lego colors, a supply team, an integration team, a quality team, and 8 different product managers who wandered from table to table. Sound familiar? Kind of like a massive construction site with lots of project managers. Or in a large company developing and installing software. Most of the building teams sat around doing very little in practice. There were lots of bottlenecks and confusion around getting supplies and exact requirements. I had a chance to engage in chitchat with my table mates. And a stressed out senior executive that walked around and yelled at anyone for not doing anything.

The second round, we continued to have individual performers who were specialists, but they worked together, which resulted in a lean assembly line. The time required to first output went down almost 50%. But there was less top down control. And more legos on the table, relative to the previous round.

And finally--the last round--everyone pitched in and contributed how they could. There were still some constraints, in that people working outside of their expertise could only use their left hand. Despite that, it only took a minute to get the first outcome, so almost 9 times faster. But there were lots of extraneous legos on the table. It was lots of fun, and it was a very tactile learning experience for everyone who pitched in. Just like kindergarten.

What does this mean

This boils down to control, profitability, and speed. This is just as true for startups as it is for large companies. Most of the conflicts among co-founding teams boil down to differences how founders value control and money, according to Harvard professor and researcher Noam Wasserman in Founders' Dilemmas. In big companies, any larger product development program will implictly or explicitly make a call on these three, based on how the work is organized. It depends on what you optimize for, as Krzysztof the facilitator pointed out.

The construction site was optimized for control, especially of costs. There were enough people to do the work, and enough legos could be procured if you were willing to wait. But the level of resource scarcity locked up the system, relatively speaking. And it took a long time to finish anything.

The assembly line required a slightly larger up front investment but the speed at which things happened increased dramatically. Even though the constraints on each individual were exactly the same. As an expert in yellow and green bricks, I was still only allowed to touch these, even though the configuration was completely different.

The kindergarten required even less top down control and more resources, as well as trust that the teams will get on with it. There was be a higher use of resources (lego blocks laying on the table). At any given moment, you won't know exactly what is going on, because everyone is contributing and collaborating. The teams were releasing stuff like crazy. So at that point, does it really matter that you need a bit more money up front? If they are releasing stuff so quickly, presumably this translates into revenue, which keeps the kindergarten afloat and then some.

Choosing the metaphor works that best for your company

The way you organize the work matters. And it feeds into culture. Larman said "Culture follows structure". In a software context, it means you want to allow for chaos and experimentation. And not really just squeezing features out of development teams.

As a company scales from a successful startup to a larger company, the trick is to keep enough of that "kindergarten juice" in the culture and in how the work is organized, in order to allow your company to continue innovating. If the emphasis on control changes as a product matures, you can introduce more of that as needed. But do so consciously, and watch your output and outcomes like a hawk.

By micromanaging the process, even as an assembly line in a feature factory, you're still missing out on pretty big upside (assuming you care about having lots of new products released).

That said, even a kindergarten needs boundaries. So that the teams don't cut corners in quality for example. That's kind of the point. There are a handful of non-negotiables around safety, health, and security in a kindergarten, and everything else is optimized for discovery.

So for a bunch of interested strangers on a random school night, who dug into a few alternative structures and held everything else constant, it was clear that there could be very large differences at play. 14x faster, not 14% faster. These would be results any agile or digital transformation program would love to achieve. That said, it wasn't clear if these differences came from structure only, or the culture around it. And if culture is involved, that could be what's preventing the massive change in the first place.

Key Takeaways

• The way you organize work matters, and it feeds into the culture, particularly in a larger company.
• By organizing work, you will be making choices about tradeoffs among variables that matter.
• Control, in particular, seems to be inversely related with learning and speed.

Why building for the entire market bloats timeframes, and what to do instead

In High Output Management by Andy Grove, Intel's founding CEO, Grove suggests that Intel operated in an environment where they needed to manufacture units to a market forecast. From the beginning in the 1960s, they didn't have the luxury of selling up front and building exactly what was sold. Nowadays, this is pretty much the defacto environment for product development. Even in the case of software, where there is no manufacturing or reproduction cost, timing the scope to match demand is a core component of a software company's success.

In order to plan the release of a product, you need a clear scope of what product development needs to happen first. This includes breaking down tasks, estimating them, and then mapping the specific features to expected customer value. This way you come up with a set of features that need to be created, in order to release the product (or release it again).

How this typically plays out in practice

In practice once this is agreed, new ideas come up. New stakeholders propose specific changes or additions to that original scope. You might even want to try reaching more prospects in a related segment.

1. Add a bit more scope: The natural impulse-in this environment- is for product development teams to simply add scope to the list of stories or tasks which were already agreed.

Vicious feedback loop for scope

2. Push the release back a bit: As soon as they add another feature, this effectively means more work needs to be done. So the effective date when everything will be done is pushed back. Usually this means the estimated completion date needs to be adjusted, even if this isn't explicitly acknowledged by the team.

3. Delay market feedback a bit: If the release date is moved back, the team delays getting market feedback. Depending on the size of the feature, it might be a few days in a software context. Or a few weeks.

4. Reduce probability sales: of If the feedback is delayed, you reduce the team's confidence that the product will sell. The less feedback you have, the lower the probability of hitting your sales forecast when you ultimately do release. So your probability-weighted revenue goes down, the later you release. In a sales context, "money follows speed" is common knowledge. Being able to close a deal quickly is really important, because if you don't, it's likely the customer will change their mind. And finally, if you are less certain about your sales forecast, this typically influences your overall confidence level in the product. And one of the most natural things done in this case is too...add a bit more scope.

Deja vu. The cycle repeats.

Paradoxically, the more scope you add, the lower the chances of market success of the release. Because you're innovating in a vacuum/ivory tower/echo chamber/<insert favorite metaphor here>. Even though you think you are improving your product's chances. Having too many features is overwhelming for prospects and difficult to communicate for you. The paradox of choice kicks in.

Also, if you delay the release date, you are likely to struggle to make sales until that date. There are "forward contracts" or "letters of intent", however customers will only go for something like this if they are highly motivated to get your solution. It also adds a layer of complexity and obviously a delay, thus making it harder to sell the product.

Implementation notes for startups

In the startup case, you need to get enough scope to attract early adopters in Moore's technology adoption curve. This will typically be one or a handful of related features which address a core need of theirs and which they can't address anywhere else.

Source: Harvard Innovation Lab

The idea is that you need enough scope to go after a narrow group of people, just to get started and out the door. Trying to build enough scope for the entire market will mean you'll never actually move ahead with your business. Because you need to launch it first. The sooner you get it out there, the better for you.

Once you have nailed that first segment, you expand to adjacent segments. You modify the product to appeal to the adjacent segments. And then go sell to them. Do this incrementally, so that you have the benefit of revenues from the first customers. And confidence from initial market success.

Implementation notes for established companies

The above is true for larger companies; however, they have internal operational challenges to overcome also. In particular each of the 4 parts of the circle are often represented by different department heads. Each has his or her own agenda to push.

And while each incremental change might seem to make sense in the short term, the overall effect is the delay of a release. And no one is individually responsible for it.

source: Randy Olson | the operational usefulness of pie charts

Moreover, in a large company environment, go-to-market decisions are often made based on overall market size. While this is useful to think through e.g. positioning of a new product, thinking in terms of top-down market pie charts doesn't translate into a plan to enter the market. Different slices of the pie will want different features, with some overlap across the market.

It's ok to plan to enter the entire market eventually, but it's smarter to prove the approach works on a small corner of the market--before you expand outwards.

Acknowledge it's uncomfortable, and just do it anyway

I get it. It feels unnatural to be selling something that isn't perfect. It's easy to succumb to a fear of rejection, and just put off the prospect of releasing the product for as long as you can. I've done it in the past on my own dime. I hear the mechanism at play when mentoring founders. I see the dynamics play out in larger companies every day. Every product team with an ounce of humanity is susceptible to this.

Focus on a small subset of customers with a similar set of needs, and only build the scope that they need. Keep it laser focussed. And get it out there, even if it's not perfect. Especially in a business context, if your product addresses the core need they have, they will be happy.

Ultimately, fear of rejection just a bias that prevents you from learning what you need to know to make your new product a success. If necessary, speak to customers about their problems only--and don't show them your solution right away. Most people are happy to gripe to a friendly ear, especially if it's about something they care about. Don't make promises you don't expect to keep. But start speaking with flesh and blood customers right from the beginning.

The one thing Steve Jobs did that turned around Apple

After a nasty battle with Apple shareholders, Steve Jobs, then the original founding CEO, was ousted. He went on to create NeXt computers (later acquired by Disney). In the meantime, Apple drifted as a company. It proliferated product lines. Lost focus. And the share price entered a death spiral phase. A few years later in 1997, he was recruited back to save the company from very poor public share price performance.

"Saint Steve" at Macworld 1998

When we got to the company a year ago, there were a lot of products. There were 15 product platforms and a zillion variants of each one. I couldn't even figure this out myself. After about three weeks. I said, "how are we gonna explain this to others, when we don't even know which products to recommend to our friends?"

In this keynote at 1998 Macworld, he announced early successes, such as a 3rd consecutive profitable quarter. In my opinion, one of the most powerful parts of his talk was the following grid:

The 4 apple quadrants, source: Apple

In effect, after a strategic review of all 15+ product lines, Jobs decided that these four were the only products worth focusing on. Consumer was aimed at consumers and education. Pro was aimed at publishing and design. Everything else was shut down. Here was his rationale:

As a matter of fact, if we only get four, we could put the A-Team on every single one of them. And if we only have four, we could turn them all every nine months instead of every 18 months. And if we only had, four we could be working on the next generation or two of each one, as we're introducing the first generation. So that's what we decided to do: to focus on four great products. And the first one that we introduced of course was the Desktop Pro product.

Notice that the main practical reason Steve Jobs cited for this change is the reduced product release time, or cycle time. Or low velocity in agile terms. He could release a lot of resources. Focus them just on these 4 great products. And get out of the bureaucratic quagmire that was holding the company back.

This was the kind of "zero-based thinking" decision that a hired gun CEO would be afraid to make, but a founding CEO could find the courage to do. To implement a company redesign and rethinking from first principles, rather than just tinkering around the edges. Steve Jobs knew what life before Apple was like, because he was there. And he already had a successful "go" at building the company. So it didn't take much to identify that the company needed to be slimmed down and focussed in order to become stronger.

Of course, there was uproar amongst developers with vested interests in existing product lines. To a lesser extent, among clients of the cancelled products. But this marked the beginning of Apple's long climb to a corporate icon and stock market darling.